Death Qualification of Juries As a Violation of the Social Contract by Berger, Katherine E
Washington University Jurisprudence Review 
Volume 12 Issue 1 
2019 
Death Qualification of Juries As a Violation of the Social Contract 
Katherine E. Berger 
J.D. Candidate, Washington University School of Law Class of 2020 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law 
Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Legal 
Theory Commons, Natural Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine E. Berger, Death Qualification of Juries As a Violation of the Social Contract, 12 WASH. U. JUR. 
REV. 115 (2019). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Jurisprudence Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
DEATH QUALIFICATION OF JURIES AS A 
VIOLATION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
KATHERINE E. BERGER* 
“Our Constitution is a remarkable, beautiful gift. But it’s really 
just a piece of parchment. It has no power on its own. We, the people, 
give it power. We, the people, give it meaning. With our 
participation, and with the choices that we make, and the alliances 
that we forge.”1 
ABSTRACT 
 
Trial by a jury of one’s peers is a hallmark of the United States judicial 
system. The protection a jury trial is supposed to ensure, however, is 
severely compromised by current case law. Death qualification excludes 
potential jurors whose views on the death penalty “would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.” This Note 
argues that the current practice of “death qualifying” juries in capital 
murder cases violates the social contract. In the past few years, citizen 
support for the death penalty reached its lowest point since it was 
temporarily abolished by the Supreme Court in 1972. These citizens deserve 
to express their views on the death penalty through jury service. Criminal 
defendants deserve to be sentenced by a jury of their peers, reflecting the 
community consensus on the ultimate question of life or death. The practice 
of death qualification delegitimizes the State’s use of capital punishment, 
and harms both the excluded jurors and the criminal defendant. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Note argues that the current practice of “death qualifying” juries 
in capital murder cases violates the social contract. The practice of death 
qualification delegitimizes the State’s use of capital punishment, and harms 
both the excluded jurors and the criminal defendant. 
Social contract theorists generally posit that from a “state of nature” or 
“original position,” citizens give up some of their natural rights and 
unregulated freedom in order for the State or collective to govern and 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Washington University School of Law Class of 2020. 
1.  President Barack Obama, Farewell Address to the American People (Jan. 10, 2017) 
(transcript available at http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/farewell) [https://perma.cc/AHJ4-E9ZM].   
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protect them.2 Society is formed because people agree to be governed, 
calculating they will be better off than they were without any political 
authority. “Social contract theories seek to legitimate civil authority by 
appealing to notions of rational agreement.”3 Social contract theorists 
believe that punishment can only be a legitimate use of force by the State 
when it is based on principles that all citizens would agree are reasonable, 
rational, and just, knowing that they themselves determine the conduct 
which might subject them to such punishment.4  It has long been accepted 
that the framers relied upon social contract theory during the formation of 
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.5 
The framers of the Constitution viewed juries as a prerequisite to 
majoritarian self-government.6 Federalists assuaged the fears of Democratic 
Republicans about the new Constitution by ensuring additional protections 
for the institution of juries with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments.7 
Trial by a jury of one’s peers is a hallmark of the United States judicial 
system. The right to a trial by jury is important because “juries represent the 
layman's common sense, the 'passional elements in our nature,' and thus 
keep the administration of law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the 
community.”8 This protection is all the more important in criminal cases and 
 
 
2.   See generally THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (Penguin Classics reprinted ed. 1985) 
(1651); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Hackett Pub. Co. ed. 1980) (1690); JOHN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE ESSENTIAL ROUSSEAU (New American Library 
printed ed. 1983); and JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Discourse On Inequality, in THE ESSENTIAL 
ROUSSEAU (New American Library printed ed. 1983). See also Eli L. Levine, Note, Does the Social 
Contract Justify Felony Disenfranchisement, 1 WASH. UNIV. JUR. REV. 193–94 (2009) (“Social contract 
theorists like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau envision a compact wherein 
citizens consent to be governed by and submit to the laws of society in return for the protections and 
benefits that an organized governmental structure provides.”) (footnote omitted). 
3.  Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1999). 
4.  Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
307, 314 (2004); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION 11 (1999) (“Among 
the essential features of this [original position] is that no one know his place in society, his class position 
or social status, nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of 
the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil 
of ignorance.”). 
5.  ALLEN, supra note 3, at 2-3.  
6.  Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL 
L. REV. 203, 218 (1995). 
7.  Id. (citing Herbert J. Storing, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 19 (1981); Akhil 
R. Amar, Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1182-90 (1991); Charles W. Wolfram, 
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 668-69 (1973); Alan H. 
Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of 
Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 148 n.26 (1991)). 
8.  Id. at 219 n.99 (quoting Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343–44 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Oliver W. Holmes, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 237 (1920)). 
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can be of no greater importance than when a person’s life is at stake. 
However, for defendants being tried for capital murder and facing the death 
penalty, the protection that a trial by jury is supposed to ensure is severely 
compromised by current case law. Most capital murder trials are bifurcated 
– that is, the guilt and sentencing phases are separate.9 This is done so that 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant can be determined according to strict 
evidentiary rules. If the defendant is then found guilty, the sentencing body 
may hear evidence relevant to whether or not the defendant deserves to die, 
evidence that might have been deemed irrelevant or prejudicial if offered 
during the earlier phase at trial.10 Bifurcation itself does not weaken the 
protection that a jury offers criminal defendants facing the death penalty. 
Instead, the danger primarily stems from death qualification of juries. 
Juries are “death qualified,” or culled of potential jurors who would 
never impose the death penalty, through a series of targeted questions during 
voir dire. “Death qualification is a procedure that occurs during the jury 
selection phase of capital trials. During death qualification, potential capital 
jurors are questioned closely about their views on the death penalty, and 
those whose views are considered incompatible with the duties of capital 
jurors are excluded from the jury.”11 Three Supreme Court cases make up 
the governing law of death qualification: Witherspoon v. Illinois,12 Lockhart 
v. McCree,13 and Wainwright v. Witt.14 
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court held that although there was no 
evidence that excluding jurors morally opposed to capital punishment 
created a jury biased in favor of guilt, such exclusion still violated the 
requirement of an impartial arbiter of punishment established by the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.15 In Witherspoon, the Court set out the 
 
 
9.  COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP 
OF THE AMERICAN LAW INST. ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY 9 (Apr. 15, 2009) (“Although 
the Court has never held that bifurcated proceedings (separate guilt and sentencing phases) are 
constitutionally required, post-Furman statutes have made bifurcation the norm, and it would likely be 
held to be a constitutional essential today, should the issue ever arise.”).  
10. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976) (citing ALI, Model Penal Code § 201.6, cmt 
5, pp. 74-75 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)). 
11. William C. Thompson, Death Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart v. 
McCree, Vol. 13 No. 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1989) (citing Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of WITT: 
Understanding the Language of Death Qualification, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677 (2002) (“Death 
qualification is the process by which prospective jurors are questioned at voir dire regarding their 
attitudes toward the death penalty. Those who indicate they are so opposed to capital punishment that 
they either (1) would not find the defendant guilty regardless of the evidence, or (2) would not consider 
death as a possible sentence regardless of the circumstances of the crime, are excused for cause. They 
are not "death qualified" and may not sit”)).  
12. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
13. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
14. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
15. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-18. In Witherspoon, the petitioner was convicted under an 
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standard that jurors could be excluded for cause if they “made unmistakably 
clear” either “that they would automatically vote against the imposition of 
capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed 
at the trial of the case before them,” or if they “made unmistakably clear” 
that “their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from 
making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.”16 The Court in 
Witherspoon deliberately left open the questions of whether a jury so 
selected might be less neutral, and thus improper, with respect to guilt and 
whether a bifurcated trial could protect both the State’s interest in an 
impartial sentencing jury and the defendant’s interest in an impartial guilt 
jury.17 
In Lockhart v. McCree, the Court addressed these open questions and 
held that prosecutors may exclude, “prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated 
capital trial…prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so 
strong that it would prevent or substantially impair their performance of 
their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial.”18 The Court held 
that such “death qualification” did not violate the defendant’s Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.19 The Court reasoned that the fair cross-
section requirement did not apply to the selection of a petit jury, and 
because, even if it applied, “‘Witherspoon-excludables’ do not constitute a 
‘distinctive group’ for fair-cross-section purposes.”20 Further, the removal 
of “Witherspoon-excludables” did not “slant the jury towards conviction” 
in the eyes of the Court.”21  
In Wainwright v. Witt, the Court lowered the standard established in 
Witherspoon for death qualification. The Court held that the standard is 
“whether the juror’s views” on the death penalty “would prevent or 
 
 
Illinois statute that provided: "In trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, 
on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is 
opposed to the same.” Id. at 512. 
16. Id. at n.21.  
17. Id. at n.18.  
18. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 165. 
19. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173-77. 
20. Id. at 177. 
21. Id. at 177 (“McCree's ‘impartiality’ argument apparently is based on the theory that, 
because all individual jurors are to some extent predisposed towards one result or another, a 
constitutionally impartial jury can be constructed only by ‘balancing’ the various predispositions of the 
individual jurors. Thus, according to McCree, when the State ‘tips the scales’ by excluding prospective 
jurors with a particular viewpoint, an impermissibly partial jury results. We have consistently rejected 
this view of jury impartiality, including as recently as last Term when we squarely held that an impartial 
jury consists of nothing more than ‘jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.’ 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985) (emphasis added).”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/8
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substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 
with his instructions and his oath.”22 
In the past few years, citizen support for the death penalty reached its 
lowest point since it was temporarily abolished by the Supreme Court in 
1972.23 Gallup reported that 55% of American adults favored the death 
penalty for convicted murderers in 2017,24 while Pew Research Center 
reported that 49% favored the death penalty for convicted murderers in 
2016.25 This is consistent with the downward trend of annual death 
sentences and executions ever since the 1970s.26 This Note argues that, 
especially during a time when the country is divided on the propriety of the 
death penalty, excluding citizens who will not impose the death penalty 
from jury service in capital murder trials delegitimizes the use of capital 
punishment. This exclusion violates the rights of both the defendant and the 
excluded jurors under social contract theory. A juror’s duty is to “express 
the conscience of the community.”27 But how can the true conscience of the 
community be expressed if dissenting voices are silenced? By death 
qualifying the jury, the State is imposing the ultimate punishment without 
the consent of the governed and depriving the excluded jurors of their right 
to renegotiate and reaffirm the social contract.  
 Part I of this Note is a discussion of social contract theory, mainly 
focusing on its history and central theses. Part II examines the influence and 
presence of social contract theory in American law. Part III explains the 
governing cases that establish the practice of “death qualifying” juries in 
capital murder trials. Part IV argues that the death qualification of jurors 
delegitimizes capital punishment under social contract theory and rebuts 
common arguments against this Note’s position.  
 
 
22. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). 
23. Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972, GALLUP (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/221030/death-penalty-support-lowest-1972.aspx [https://perma.cc/LSD2-
R8VB].  
24. Id. 
25. Id.; Baxter Oliphant, Support for Death Penalty Lowest in More Than Four Decades, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/29/support-for-
death-penalty-lowest-in-more-than-four-decades/ [https://perma.cc/CCC9-TVXJ]. 
26. Brandon Garrett, Daniel Krauss & Nicholas Scurich, Capital Jurors in an Era of Death 
Penalty Decline, 126 Yale L.J.  F. 417 (2017) (citing Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 
By State and By Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-
united-states-1977-present [https://perma.cc/4K4K-N8G2] (describing data on death sentences from 
1977 to 2016)). 
27. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 (“Guided by neither rule nor standard, ‘free to select or reject 
as it [sees] fit,’ a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little 
more -- and must do nothing less -- than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate 
question of life or death.”) (citations omitted).  
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I. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
Social contract theory explores how society started. How did 
individuals, living in a “state of nature” or “original position” come together 
and form a governing body? What rights did they gain? What rights did they 
give up? How are the rules governing society made?28  
The idea of a social contract was first attributed to Socrates.29 Plato’s 
dialogue Crito narrates Socrates’ explanation of the social contract, with 
Socrates using himself as an example. Socrates is in prison, facing death.30 
Plato urges him to flee.31 Socrates replies that the State could not exist if 
every individual “set aside or overthr[ew]” the decisions of law.32 Socrates 
goes on to explain: the State has provided for him his entire life: by 
enforcing the marriage of his parents, ensuring that he was nurtured and 
educated as a child, “given [Socrates] and every other citizen a share in 
every good that [the State] had to give.”33 What’s more, when Socrates 
came of age, the State gave him the choice to leave Athens, or remain in the 
city and “enter[] into an implied contract that he will do as we command 
him.”34 Because Socrates agreed to be governed by the laws of Athens, “in 
deed, and not in word only,” he will uphold his side of the contract and stay 
in jail, instead of fleeing as his friend Crito urges him to do.35 
Thomas Hobbes was the first philosopher to deeply define and explore 
social contract theory.36 Hobbes “start[ed] from an assumed ‘state of 
nature.’- a political blank paper.”37 Hobbes’ version of the state of nature 
was a state of constant warfare between men.38 Hobbes theorized that 
humans are rational and “naturally and exclusively self-interested.”39 If left 
 
 
28. This Note does not look at social contract theory from a critical race theory or feminist 
theory perspective. Future research can and should be done on whether social contract theory is even an 
appropriate lens through which to justify our legal system, considering that African Americans, Native 
Americans, and women were excluded from the original social contract.  
29. Celeste Friend, Social Contract Theory, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006), 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/ [https://perma.cc/5L8Y-8YJQ]. 
30. PLATO, CRITO, translated by Benjamin Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/crito.html 
[https://perma.cc/F26L-S83A]. 
31. Id. 
32. Id.  
33. Id.  
34. Id.  
35. PLATO, supra note 30. 
36. Levine, supra note 2, at 204 (citing Friend, supra note 29). 
37. Frederick Pollock, Hobbes and Locke: The Social Contract in English Political 
Philosophy, 9 J. SOC’Y COMP. LEGIS. 107, 109 (1908). 
38. Id. 
39. Friend, supra note 29, at 2(a) (“Hobbes also infers from his mechanistic theory of human 
nature that humans are necessarily and exclusively self-interested. In addition to being exclusively self-
interested, Hobbes also argues that human beings are reasonable. They have in them the rational capacity 
to pursue their desires as efficiently and maximally as possible.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/8
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alone in a “state of nature,” life would be an endless battle of distrust and 
brutal warfare, as everyone would solely be trying to maximize their own 
self-interest.40 People would have “no capacity to ensure the long-term 
satisfaction of their needs or desires.”41 While Hobbes believed that men 
would recognize certain laws of nature because they are rational,42 they 
lacked any enforcement mechanism to effectively protect the rights of 
individuals.43 Therefore, according to Hobbes, rational people “will choose 
to submit to the authority of a Sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil 
society, which is conducive to their own interests.”44  Specifically, all 
members of a society must “collectively and reciprocally renounc[e] the 
rights they had against one another in a State of Nature,” agree to live in 
peace under a set of laws, and entrust some Sovereign with the power to 
enforce the social contract.45  
John Locke also theorized a social contract emerging from a “state of 
nature,” but his “state of nature” was of a different kind.46 Scholars such as 
Celeste Friend have observed that Locke’s “state of nature” is “pre-
political,” like Hobbes’, “but it is not pre-moral.”47 Locke thought that 
 
 
40. Friend, supra note 29, at 2(a)  
In the State of Nature, every person is always in fear of losing his life to another. They have no 
capacity to ensure the long-term satisfaction of their needs or desires. No long-term or complex 
cooperation is possible because the State of Nature can be aptly described as a state of utter 
distrust. 
41. Id. at 2(a). 
42. Id. at 2(a). 
43. Levine, supra note 2, at 206. 
44. Friend, supra note 29, at 2(a) (“According to Hobbes, the justification for political 
obligation is this: given that men are naturally self-interested, yet they are rational, they will choose to 
submit to the authority of a Sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil society, which is conducive to 
their own interests.”). 
45. Id. at 2(a)  
First, they must agree to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights 
they had against one another in the State of Nature. Second, they must imbue some one person 
or assembly of persons with the authority and power to enforce the initial contract. In other 
words, to ensure their escape from the State of Nature, they must both agree to live together 
under common laws, and create an enforcement mechanism for the social contract and the laws 
that constitute it. 
46. Id. at 2(b)  
For John Locke, 1632-1704, the State of Nature is a very different type of place, and so his 
argument concerning the social contract and the nature of men's relationship to authority are 
consequently quite different. While Locke uses Hobbes’ methodological device of the State of 
Nature, as do virtually all social contract theorists, he uses it to a quite different end. 
47. Friend, supra note 29 at 2(b)  
The State of Nature, although a state wherein there is no civil authority or government to punish 
people for transgressions against laws, is not a state without morality. The State of Nature is 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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people are at complete liberty but are still bound by the law of nature handed 
down by God.48 Therefore, Locke’s “state of nature” is peaceful where 
Hobbes’ is brutal.49 However, property rights are limited in the “state of 
nature.” Because there is no political authority, there is no way to stop war 
once it begins.50 Thus, Locke posited that families form the social contract 
when they “give up the executive power to punish those who transgress the 
Law of Nature, and hand over that power to the public power of the 
government.”51 
It is important to note that because Locke’s “state of nature” was not as 
violent as Hobbes’, Locke imagined scenarios in which citizens could 
decide to revoke the social contract with their civil government, calculating 
that they would actually be better off in a state of nature.52 As Friend 
observes:  
When the executive power of a government devolves into 
tyranny,…then the resulting tyrant puts himself into a State of Nature, 
and specifically into a state of war with the people, and they then have 
the same right to self-defense as they had before making a compact 
to establish society in the first place.53  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also believed that all men are created equal, 
with “no one having a natural right to govern others, and therefore the only 
justified authority is the authority that is generated out of agreements or 
covenants.”54 Rousseau wrote of a normative social contract,55 which is 
 
 
pre-political, but it is not pre-moral. Persons are assumed to be equal to one another in such a 
state, and therefore equally capable of discovering and being bound by the Law of Nature. The 
Law of Nature, which is on Locke’s view the basis of all morality, and given to us by God, 
commands that we not harm others with regards to their "life, health, liberty, or possessions" 
(par. 6). (citation omitted). 
48. Id. at 2(b). For example, Friend notes that Locke’s state of nature includes “conjugal 
society. These societies are based on the voluntary agreements to care for children together, and they are 
moral but not political.” Id. (internal citation omitted).  
49. Pollock, supra note 37, at 110 (“For Locke the State of Nature is not a state of war until 
there is actual hostility, but only a state in which peace is not secure.”) (internal citation omitted). 
50. Friend, supra note 29, at 2(b) (“Since the State of Nature lacks civil authority, once war 
begins it is likely to continue.”). 
51. “Civil society is formed by every man giving up his natural power; not to a sovereign but 
‘into the hands of the Community’ or ‘to the publick.’ [sic]. The authority so conferred upon the society 
is granted only to be used for the public good.” Pollock, supra note 37, at 110 (internal citation omitted). 
52. Friend, supra note 29 at 2(b). Locke wrote specifically to refute the divine power of a 
monarch to rule.  
53. Friend, supra note 29, at 2(b). 
54. Id. at 2(c).  
55. Id. at 2(c) (“The second is his normative, or idealized theory of the social contract, and is 
meant to provide the means by which to alleviate the problems that modern society has created for us, 
as laid out in the Social Contract.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/8
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meant to eliminate the inequalities caused by the creation of property 
rights.56 Rousseau theorized that people can live together in peace, without 
becoming subject to force, coercion, or inequality, by accepting that the 
“will” of society, as expressed through agreement of all citizens, must 
supersede each individual’s personal will.57  
Agreement appears in Locke’s, Hobbes’s, and Rousseau’s theories of 
civic society. Levine wrote, “A common element for social theorists is the 
‘foundation of the true or authentic body politic is held to be a pact or 
agreement made by all the individuals who are to compose it.’”58 However, 
he noted, “Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau had very different conceptions of 
the political and judicial system to be created through the social contract.”59 
Specifically, the three theorists had different ideas of how much power 
citizens would retain. For Hobbes, upon citizens giving up their natural 
rights to the sovereign, the sovereign was “all-powerful, bound only by the 
laws of nature.”60 The sovereign did not answer to the citizens - “[t]here is 
not actual voting in Hobbes’s social contract and citizens do not have any 
influence over public policy.”61 In contrast, Locke envisioned that once 
families gave up their natural rights and placed them “into the hands of the 
Community,” society would “establish[] a government with legislative and 
executive organs by the decision of the majority.”62 Finally, Rousseau 
imagined a “society ruled by the collectivist general will of the people,” 
with no distinction between ruler and subject.63 
John Rawls, a twentieth-century American philosopher, focused more 
on the limits of how the social contract should be negotiated.64 Rawls started 
with the “original position”: a “highly abstracted version of the State of 
Nature.”65 The original position imagines people in a hypothetical situation, 
debating what their new society will require of its citizens and what it will 
owe to them.66 People are limited by the veil of ignorance—they lack any 
particular knowledge of their circumstances, such as gender, race, particular 
 
 
56. Id. at 2(c) (“For Rousseau the invention of property constitutes humanity’s ‘fall from 
grace’ out of the State of Nature.”).  
57. Id. at 2(c). 
58. Levine, supra note 2, at 205 (quoting THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS 
37 (David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds., 1994)). 
59. Id. at 206.  
60. Id. at 207. 
61. Id. at 208. 
62. Levine, supra note 2, at 207. 
63. Id. at 206-07. 
64. Friend, supra note 29, at 3(a).   
65. Id. at 3(a). 
66. Id. at 3(a). 
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talents or disabilities, age, or social status.67 They are also assumed to be 
rational and disinterested in one another’s well being.68 
Rawls posited that parties in the original position are equal.69 Two 
“principles of justice” would control bargaining over the social contract in 
the original position according to Rawls: first, that “each person have an 
equal right to the most extensive total scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”70 Second, that “social 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged…and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”71 
Because the principles of justice that will go on to form the terms of the 
social contract should be agreed upon under these fair conditions, Rawls 
called his theory “justice as fairness.”72  
 Rawls also discussed civil disobedience in the framework of social 
contract theory. Specifically, Rawls called civil disobedience “a crucial test 
case for any theory of the moral basis of democracy.”73 Rawls defined civil 
 
 
67. Id. at 3(a). 
68. Id. at 3(a). 
69. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 17. 
70. Id. at 52-53. 
71. Id. at 52-53.  
72. Friend, supra note 29. See also Dolovich, supra note 4, at 314-15, n.16  
Rawls argues that political power is legitimately exercised by the state over its citizens only 
when it is exercised on the basis of a collective agreement ‘the essentials of which all citizens 
may reasonably be expected to endorse’ under fair deliberative conditions. As he sees it, such 
fair deliberative conditions are those that allow consideration of the terms of state power from 
a ‘suitably general point of view’, which he defines as the perspective from which no participant 
to the deliberative process knows anything about the particulars of his or her own personal 
identity or social position. Id. at n.16 On Rawls's view, that is, if state power is to be legitimate, 
agreement as to the terms of its exercise must come from citizens who do not know the first 
thing about their own situation and who must therefore accord due consideration to the 
perspectives of all members of society.  
Id. at n.16. See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (1993). This is the idea behind what 
Rawls refers to as the “liberal principle of legitimacy,” that “our exercise of political power is proper 
and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which 
all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them 
as reasonable and rational.”  
73. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 319  
As I have already indicated, this theory [of civil disobedience] is designed only for the 
special case of a nearly just society, one that is well-ordered for the most part but in which some 
serious violations of justice nevertheless do occur. Since I assume that a state of near justice 
requires a democratic regime, the theory concerns the role and the appropriateness of civil 
disobedience to legitimately established democratic authority…The problem of civil 
disobedience, as I shall interpret it, arises only within a more or less just democratic state for 
those citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution. The difficulty is one 
of a conflict of duties. At what point does the duty to comply with laws enacted by a legislative 
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disobedience as a “public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act 
contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the 
law or policies of the government.”74 Rawls argued that civil disobedience 
is justified when the principle of equal liberty is being violated and when 
“normal appeals to the political majority have already been made in good 
faith and that they have failed.”75 Rawls noted that civil disobedience 
challenges a system to change, while accepting the legitimacy of the system. 
“By acting within the confines of the system, the civil disobedient reveals 
his acceptance of the social contract… A common modern formulation [of 
the social contract] is that citizens, by their political participation, consent 
to properly enacted laws.”76  
Social contract theory, specifically normative contractarianism, 
contends that punishment by the State is only legitimate when exercised in 
accordance with principles that all citizens believe to be just.77 Scholars 
argue that normative contractarianism springs logically from Rawls’s 
 
 
majority (or with executive acts supported by such a majority) cease to be binding in view of 
the right to defend one’s liberties and the duty to oppose injustice?  
74. Id.  
75. Id. at 326-28  
Since civil disobedience is a last resort, we should be sure that it is necessary. Note that 
it has not been said, however, that legal means have been exhausted. At any rate, further normal 
appeals can be repeated; free speech is always possible. But if past actions have shown the 
majority immovable or apathetic, further attempts may reasonably be thought fruitless….  
76. Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, The State Made Me Do It: The Applicability of 
the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1190 n.90 (1987), citing R. 
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985); J. PLAMENATZ, CONSENT, FREEDOM, AND POLITICAL 
OBLIGATION 170-71 (2d ed. 1968). 
77. Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument against the Death Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1283, 1311 n.56 (2006).  
Contractarian theories regard the major rules and institutions of civil society as legitimate 
insofar as they can be thought of as based on an agreement among the individuals who must 
submit to their authority. There are two dominant strains in the contractarian tradition, what we 
might call ‘normative contractarianism,’ on the one hand, and ‘rational choice 
contractarianism,’ on the other. Although normative contractarianism descends from Kant, it 
covers a variety of views, the most influential of which in recent years has been John Rawls's. 
According to Rawls, we can best discern intuitions about justice in a liberal society by asking 
what principles of justice would be selected by individuals entering into a political arrangement 
with one another, prior to the existence of social institutions of any sort. Rawls assumes that in 
this original position of choice, the contractors are selecting principles of justice without any 
knowledge of the particular circumstances they will inhabit in society or what their personal 
characteristics will be. Rational choice contractarianism, by contrast, descends from Hobbes. It 
asks what form of social organization rational agents seeking to maximize their own welfare 
would choose to improve their positions relative to their presocial [sic] baselines. To the extent 
the contractarian tradition has been brought into legal theory, it has almost entirely been of the 
normative variety. 
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conception of justice as fairness.78 Specifically, Professor Claire Finkelstein 
cited Rawls to argue that a system of punishment is legitimate only if 
citizens consent to it, “based on a perception that they will be better off 
under such a system than they would be in its absence.”79 The State gains 
the power to punish through the social contract because citizens give up 
their right to individually enforce natural law against fellow citizens. 
Individuals enter into this social contract because they believe that their 
personal and property rights will be better protected by civil society than 
through their own individual efforts. However, if citizens believe that the 
security provided by the deterrent effect of a punishment does not outweigh 
the harm they would suffer should they themselves be subject to the 
punishment, they would not agree to include the punishment as an option 
available to the sovereign or collective.80 Finkelstein put it this way:  
Since the death penalty is only one in a range of possible 
punishments, including incarceration and fines, the question the 
contractors face is: Does the marginal increase in personal security 
due to the death penalty, when compared with other possible 
punishments, deter murder so much that it outweighs the marginal 
loss of personal security a person subject to that penalty would 
suffer? Here we can see that even in the unlikely event that each 
application of the death penalty deterred eight additional murders, the 
marginal value of that added deterrence would likely be outweighed 
by the marginal cost of the death penalty. The contractors therefore 
would reject it.81 
This Note submits that one way the contractors would, and should be 
able to, reject the death penalty is through serving on death penalty juries 
and refusing to impose the death penalty. 
II. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IN AMERICAN LAW  
William Blackstone incorporated social contract theory into English 
common law,82 and the framers of our Constitution drew from this source, 
 
 
78. Rawls wrote that a society organized around his principle of justice as fairness would 
come “as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and 
equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are 
autonomous and the obligations they recognize self-imposed.” RAWLS, supra note 4, at 13.  
79. Finkelstein, supra note 77, at 1329. 
80. Id. at 1323. 
81. Id. at 1323-24. 
82. Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 
L. & INEQ. 1, 18-19 (1992) (“American civil rights theory derives in part from 17th century ‘social 
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as well as from the work of John Locke and other social contract theorists.83 
United States courts have frequently cited social contract theory in order to 
legitimize the legal system’s authority.84 Indeed, the idea of a sovereign 
being “ordained and established” through the assent of the people was 
explicitly relied on in McCulloch v. Maryland.85  
Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence and a 
“central figure in the early development of American democracy,”86 did not 
believe that the social contract was cemented after first being entered into. 
Rather, he believed it would be “periodically renewed.”87 Jefferson thought 
renewal should happen every generation, specifically in the form of an 
opportunity for revision of fundamental law every nineteen years.88 “Since 
conditions change and men change, there must be opportunity for 
corresponding change in political institutions, and also for a renewal of the 
principle of government by consent of the governed.”89 
This is relevant because social contract theory was relied on in creating 
the United States political and judicial system, and it is still considered an 
underlying justification for both systems today. Professor Allen, in an 
exhaustive and admirable effort, notes that social contractarian rationales 
 
 
contract’ tradition which was translated into English common law by William Blackstone and found 
expression in the U.S. Constitution.”). 
83. See ALLEN, supra note 3, at 2-3. See also Levine, supra note 2, citing Brenneke, supra 
note 82 at 18-19 (“American civil rights theory derives in part from 17th century ‘social contract’ 
tradition which was translated into English common law by William Blackstone and found expression 
in the U.S. Constitution.”).  
84. Levine, supra note 2, at 209.  
85. “The government proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established’ in the 
name of the people…the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject [the Constitution]; and their 
act was final.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403-04 (1819). 
86. C. E. Merriam, Jr., The Political Theory of Jefferson, 17 POL. SCI. Q. 24, (Mar. 1902). 
87. Id. at 26.  
Government is established, however, by the ‘consent of the governed,’ or at least a just 
government is so supported. What, then, is the nature of this consent, and how is it to be made 
effective amid constantly changing conditions? Jefferson was not satisfied with a contract made 
once and for all, like that of Hobbes, or with a merely hypothetical contract, or even with a 
presumption of tacit consent from the fact of residence. He looked upon the contract as a 
necessary foundation for legitimate government, and he considered that the agreement should 
have historical as well as logical validity. The principle of the social contract must be sacredly 
preserved in the life of the people, and Jefferson proposed two ways of insuring this end: first, 
by revolution; second, by periodical renewal of the agreement.  
88. Id. at 28-29  
The earth belongs in usutruct to the living; the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.’ It 
follows, then, that no generation of men can pass any law binding for a period longer than the 
lifetime of that generation, because their law-making power ceases with their existence. If one 
generation could bind another, the dead and not the living would rule. 
89. Id. 
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and/or rhetoric appears in “[j]udicial opinions relating to matters as varied 
as sovereignty,90 slavery,91 alienage,92 the negligence rule,93 criminal 
incarceration,94 Congressional nondelegation,95 land use,96 the law of 
 
 
90. Allen, supra note 3, at 6 n.17  
See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("Some doubts have been expressed 
as to the source of the immunity of a soveriegn [sic] power from suit without its permission, 
but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. (Leviathan, C. 
26,2.)"); Occidental of UMM al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 
1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1978) ("In their external relations, sovereigns are bound by no law, they 
are like our ancestors before the recognition or imposition of the social contract."); Carl Marks 
& Co. v. USSR, 665 F. Supp. 323, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The classic expression of the doctrine 
of absolute immunity in our courts was offered, in language resonant of Thomas Hobbes by 
Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137, 
3 L.Ed 287 (1812). 
91. Id. at 6 n.18 (“See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368 
(1845) (blacks are outside of the social contract).”). 
92. Id. at 6 n.19  
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 1988). Courts 
sometimes describe each nation of the world as having its own social contract. See, e.g., Banco 
Nacionale de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding 
that a new social contract in a foreign nation does not give rise to claims for compensation for 
bad investments abroad). So, while aliens may be excluded from our social contract, they have 
the possibility of inclusion in their own. 
93. Id. at 6 n.20 (“See Losee v. Buchannan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).”). 
94. Id. at 6 n.21 (“See Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that New York 
statutes disenfranchising incarcerated felons were rationally related to social contract principles). Cf. 
Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Sharp, 473 F. Supp. 1017, 1027 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (finding that prisoners' 
rights were supported by the social contract).”). 
95. Allen, supra note 3, at 6 n.22  
See Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264 (1996) (stating that Locke 
was opposed to legislative delegation); United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36, 44 n.5 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1988) ("[The nondelegation doctrine is derived from the contractarian view that 'laws 
derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed and, in the American polity, the 
constitutional delegation of lawmaking power to the Congress establishes this consent."' 
(quoting Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 
(1982)). 
96. Allen, supra note 3, at 6 n.23 (“Cf. Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Bums, 193 So. 
2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967) (stating "that the public interest demands that there be some impairment 
of the individual citizen's right to enjoy absolute freedom in the use of public" lands).”). 
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finds,97 public health,98 self-incrimination,99 civil forfeiture,100 debt 
collection,101 and the right to privacy.”102103Courts across the United States 
have relied on social contract theory, either as the basis for their decision, 
or as a rhetorical device to give their decision legitimacy, or both. It stands 
to reason that the laws of the United States, therefore, ought to be created 
and enforced in a way consistent with social contract theory. 
III. DEATH QUALIFICATION OF JURIES 
Currently, Supreme Court precedent allows prosecutors to “death 
qualify” capital murder juries by excluding all citizens “whose opposition 
to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair 
the performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the 
trial.”104 Death qualifying the jury is standard practice in every capital 
murder trial. 
The Supreme Court held in Witherspoon v. Illinois that while jurors who 
stated that they would never impose the death penalty could be excluded, 
the exclusion of jurors who were personally  opposed to the death penalty 
 
 
97. Id. at 6 n.24  
Cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526 n. 19 (1982) ("right to appropriate a derelict... 
existed in a State of Nature"); Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(involving a dispute over rights to salvage silver from a sunken barge and stating that "[t]he 
common law of finds treats property that is abandoned as returned to the State of Nature"). 
98. Id. at 6 n.25  
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) (holding that state police powers extend 
to compulsory vaccinations and citing a phrase from the Massachusetts Constitution "that laid 
down as a fundamental principle of the social compact that the whole people covenants with 
each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws 
for 'the common good"'); cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (finding that the state 
may regulate the maximum charges allowed for the storage of grain); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 155 F. 554,568-69 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1907) (power to regulate telephone 
charges); City & County of Denver v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 167 P. 969, 969-70 (Colo. 
1917) (ordering removal of certain railroad tracks in town); Board of Barber Examiners v. 
Parker, 182 So. 485, 504-05 (1938) (power to regulate barbers). 
99. Id. at 6-7 n.26 (“See Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Even Thomas 
Hobbes, staunch defender of authoritarian government" defended the right against self-
incrimination.).”). 
100. Allen, supra note 3, at 7 n.27 (“See United States v. 785 St. Nicholas Ave., 983 F.2d 396, 
402 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The true reason for permitting forfeiture, according to Blackstone, was that it is 
part of the price a citizen must pay for breaking the social contract by violating the law.").”). 
101. Id. at 7 n.28 (“See Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 204-05 (1st Cir. 1975) (distraint of 
lodger's property).”). 
102. Id. at 7 n.29 (“See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905).”). 
103. Id. at 5-7. 
104. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 
412, 424 (1985). 
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—but who would be willing to consider it as a punishment if instructed on 
the law by the court—would violate the defendant’s right to an impartial 
jury established by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.105 Put simply, a 
personal opposition to the death penalty would not disqualify a prospective 
juror, but refusing to consider aggravating and mitigating factors would.106 
The Court began its analysis by rejecting the scientific evidence offered by 
the petitioner that death qualified jurors are more prone to convict.107 The 
Court reasoned that while eliminating any juror that opposed the death 
penalty on principle would result in a jury “uncommonly willing to 
condemn a man to die,” excluding only those who stated they “would not 
even consider returning a verdict of death” results in a neutral jury.108 This 
class of potential jurors became known as “Witherspoon-excludables.”109 
This holding did not result in neutral juries. Death qualification 
continues to create the conviction-prone juries that the Court feared in 
Witherspoon. Through the exercise of peremptory strikes, prosecutors often 
eliminate jurors who admit during voir dire that they have “serious 
reservations” about the death penalty but who would not be excludable 
under Witt.110 This occurrence, along with death qualification, leads to juries 
that are “stripped of all opponents of capital punishment.”111 
The Court in Witherspoon deliberately left open the questions of 
whether a jury so selected might be less neutral concerning guilt and thus 
 
 
105. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520-21. 
106. Id. at 520-21.  
107. Id. at 517-18  
The data adduced by the petitioner, however, are too tentative and fragmentary to establish that 
jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of 
guilt. We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now before us or as a matter 
of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an 
unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction. 
108. Witherspoon, at 520–21. The petitioner challenged an Illinois statute allowing challenges 
for cause of any juror who stated that he had “conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that 
he is opposed to the same,” without even attempting to find out if those scruples would cause the juror 
to invariably vote against the death penalty. The Court notes that “[t]he trial judge said early in the voir 
dire, ‘Let's get these conscientious objectors out of the way, without wasting any time on them.’ In rapid 
succession, 47 veniremen were successfully challenged for cause on the basis of their attitudes toward 
the death penalty.” Only 5 jurors would have actually been excludable based on their answers. Id. at 
514. The Supreme Court: 1) refused to find or take judicial notice that excluding jurors opposed to capital 
punishment results in a conviction-prone jury; 2) found that with respect to punishment, the defendant 
was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury; 3) held that a “jury from 
which all opponents of the death penalty have been excluded cannot express the conscience of the 
community on the ultimate question of life or death;” and 4) a death sentence returned by a jury that is 
“organized to return a verdict of death” cannot be carried out.  
109. See, e.g., Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 167 n.1.  
110. Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors: Death Qualification and 
Evolving Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L.J. 113, 118, 121 (2016). 
111. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/8
   
 
 
 
 
 
2019] DEATH QUALIFICATION & THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 131 
 
 
 
improper and whether a bifurcated trial could protect both the State’s 
interest in an impartial sentencing jury and the defendant’s interest in an 
impartial guilt jury.112 
In Lockhart v. McCree, the Supreme Court addressed these open 
questions and held that “removal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a 
bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death 
penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial” is 
constitutional.113 The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that such 
"death qualification" violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.114 The Court determined that the fair cross-section requirement did 
not apply to the selection of a petit jury.115 The Court reasoned that even if 
the requirement applied, the prospective jurors that were excluded did not 
constitute “a distinctive group that may not be systematically excluded from 
juries.”116 The Court further reasoned that the removal of the prospective 
jurors did not “slant the jury toward conviction.”117 The interpretation of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in Lockhart v. McCree cemented the 
practice known as “death qualification” of capital murder juries and seems 
to have closed off any legal challenge to death qualification based on the 
fair cross-section requirement.118  
 The Court in Lockhart also dismissed the petitioner’s social science data. 
The Court explained that it felt “constrained to point out what we believe to 
be several serious flaws in the evidence” relied upon by the lower courts.119 
The Court said that the fifteen social science studies the lower courts relied 
upon to conclude that death qualified juries were more conviction-prone 
 
 
112. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18.  
113. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. at 162, 165 (1986). Petitioner was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole after all “Witherspoon-excludables,” or those venire 
members who stated that they could not ever vote for imposition of the death penalty, were removed for 
cause. Petitioner alleged that “death qualification of his jury violated his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to have his guilt or innocence determined by an impartial jury selected from a 
representative cross section of the community.” The Supreme Court held that the right to “an impartial 
jury and the fair-cross-section requirement were not violated by the removal for cause, prior to the guilt 
phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong 
that it would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing 
phase of the trial.” The Court went on to note that their decision would not change even “assuming, 
arguendo, that the social science studies introduced in the courts below were adequate to establish that 
‘death qualification’ in fact produces conviction prone juries.”  
114. Id. at 173-77. 
115. Id at 177-83. 
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 177-83. 
118. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) (summarizing and applying 
Lockhart, 476 U.S. 162). 
119. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168. 
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were “too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to 
the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of 
guilt.”120 The Court also expressed concern that the studies had been based 
on individuals who were not actual jurors sworn under oath and had “serious 
doubts about the value of these studies in predicting the behavior of actual 
jurors.”121 
In Wainwright v. Witt, the Court lowered the standard it established in 
Witherspoon for when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause based 
on her views on the death penalty. The Court held that the standard is 
“whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and 
his oath.’”122  
Recent data suggests that support for the death penalty in 2016 and 2017 
reached a four-decade low,123 the lowest support for the death penalty has 
been since the Supreme Court temporarily abolished the death penalty in 
1972.124 A 2017 Gallup poll found that only 55% of Americans favored the 
death penalty for convicted murderers.125 A 2016 Pew Research Center poll 
found that only 49% of Americans favored the death penalty for convicted 
murderers.126  The polls showed that support was lowest among women and 
racial minorities.127 These poll results mean that a large number of 
prospective jurors are excludable under Wainwright and Lockhart.128 
 
 
120. Id. at 170. 
121. Id. at 171. 
122. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424. (citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). 
123. Jones, supra note 23. The last time support had dipped below 60% was in 1972. Three 
months before the Court’s ruling in Furman v. Georgia, infra note 124, support was at 50%. Four months 
after that decision, support was at 57%. Jones, supra note 23. According to Pew Research Center, support 
slightly increased to 54% in 2018. Oliphant, supra note 25. 
124. The Supreme Court case that suspended the death penalty in 1972 was Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). Furman combined three challenges and presented the question: "Does 
the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?” The Court, per curiam, held that 
it did. Justices Marshall and Brennan found the death penalty to be unconstitutional per se. Justices 
Douglas and Stewart found the death penalty to be unconstitutional when, as in Petitioners cases, it is 
applied in a discriminatory or capricious manner. Justice White found that as administered in the cases 
at hand, the death penalty was so infrequently imposed that it was “too attenuated to be of substantial 
service to criminal justice.” 
125. Jones, supra note 23. 
126. Oliphant, supra note 25. 
127. Oliphant, supra note 25. Specifically, the 2016 Pew Research Center poll found that 55% 
of men supported the death penalty as compared to 43% of women. 57% of whites supported the death 
penalty as compared to 29% of blacks and 36% of Hispanics. 72% of Republicans supported the death 
penalty while only 34% of Democrats did. 44% of Independents supported the death penalty. 
128. See Garrett, supra note 26. Surveys of jurors in previous decades had suggested that 10-
20% would be excludable under Wainwright. However, this study found that 35% or more of jurors 
reporting for jury service in Orange County, California were Witherspoon/Witt excludable. Roughly 
25% of those sampled identified as a nullifier, or someone who would be reluctant to find a person guilty 
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Death qualifying juries results in racially prejudiced,129 conviction-
prone juries130 but results in no significant deterrent effect.131 The reasons 
traditionally given to justify the death penalty and death qualification of 
juries132 fall flat in the face of empirical data. The Supreme Court in 
Witherspoon and Lockhart concluded that the social science available at the 
time was fragmentary, unreliable, and of questionable value in court 
cases.133 Modern statistics, however, show that the death penalty has a 
marginal deterrent impact and is often applied in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner—or worse, upon racial lines (based on the race of the defendant 
and/or the race of the victim).  
The Capital Jury Project was founded in 1990 to answer the Supreme 
Court’s call for more reliable social science research.134 One of the Capital 
Jury Project’s missions is to generate "a comprehensive and detailed 
understanding of how capital jurors actually make their life or death 
decisions."135 Interviews were conducted with 1198 jurors from 353 capital 
murder trials in 14 states.136 This methodical research, designed to address 
the Court’s concerns in Lockhart v. McCree, supports the same conclusion 
as the research cited in 1986: Death qualification results in juries that are 
“uncommonly willing to find guilt, and uncommonly willing to mete out 
 
 
of capital murder if they knew the death penalty was a possibility. Id. at 419-20. 
129. See Robert L. Young, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Conviction Orientation, Racial 
Attitudes, and Support for Capital Punishment, 25 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 151, 161 (2004) (summarizing 
research and finding that “racially prejudiced beliefs have a direct influence on the preference for 
convicting innocent defendants over acquitting guilty defendants and, therefore, both a direct and an 
indirect influence on support for the death penalty.”).  
130. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury: Is it Tilted Towards Death?, 79 JUDICATURE 
220 (Mar.-Apr. 1996) (finding that jurors misunderstand how the capital sentencing decision should be 
made, what factors they are permitted to consider, what level of proof is needed, and how to weigh 
aggravating and mitigating factors, all in a way that skews them towards guilt and a mandatory death 
sentence); Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of True 
Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769 (2006) (summarizing research and concluding that “[f]or over fifty 
years, empirical investigation has demonstrated that death qualification skews juries toward guilt and 
death.”).   
131. See Raymond Bonner and Ford Fessenden, ABSENCE OF EXECUTIONS: A Special 
Report; States with No Death Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/22/us/absence-executions-special-report-states-with-no-death-
penalty-share-lower.html [https://perma.cc/9WZK-TZH2]; Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do 
Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists, 99  J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2009). 
132. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S; Lockhart, 476 U.S; and Wainwright, 469 U.S. 
133. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-18; Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168–173.  
134. Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of 
True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 784 (2006). 
135. Id. 
136. What is the Capital Jury Project? School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, State 
University of New York, https://www.albany.edu/scj/13189.php [https://perma.cc/MED9-DC4G]. 
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death.”137 "Capital jurors hold disproportionately punitive orientations 
toward crime and criminal justice, are more likely to be conviction-prone, 
are more likely to hold racial stereotypes, and are more likely to be pro-
prosecution."138 Death qualification research suggests is actively harming 
criminal defendants. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Death Qualification of Jurors Delegitimizes Capital Punishment Under 
Social Contract Theory  
At a time when the country is split right down the middle on the death 
penalty, it cannot be said that death is a punishment to which all citizens 
consent, “based on a perception that they will be better off under such a 
system than they would be in its absence.”139 If half of the country opposes 
the death penalty for convicted murderers, that sentiment should be 
reflected in the social contract. This Note argues that jury service is one way 
in which the social contract that forms the basis of our political and judicial 
system is constantly renegotiated and reaffirmed. If the jury’s purpose is 
truly to "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question 
of life or death,"140 then “removal from the jury of a ‘significant segment of 
that community, identified solely by its view of the very subject on which 
the jury is expected to speak,’ clearly invalidates the integrity of the 
enterprise.”141 
During the founding of our country, “death qualification” of juries did 
not exist.142 G. Ben Cohen and Robert J. Smith write: 
Modern ‘death-qualification’ jurisprudence frustrates the Framers' 
understanding as to the role of the criminal jury. Whereas the jury 
envisioned by the Framers had the power to rule on the 
 
 
137. Rozelle, supra note 134, at 784-85. 
138. Id. at 785 (citing BENJAMIN FLEURY-STEINER, JUROR'S STORIES OF DEATH: HOW 
AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY INVESTS IN INEQUALITY 24–25 (2004)). 
139. Finkelstein, supra note 77, at 1329. 
140. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519. 
141. Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of WITT: Understanding the Language of Death 
Qualification, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 691 (2002) (citations omitted). 
142. G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of Death-Qualification, 59 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 87, 90 (2008)  
Though the exclusion of prospective jurors based upon their views on the death penalty was 
not permitted at common law or at the adoption of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, it is now a de facto component of capital proceedings. The Supreme Court has 
authorized the lower courts to wander from the historical basis of the Sixth Amendment. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/8
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constitutionality of the death penalty-though the force of any ruling 
applied only to the particular case on which they sat-a prospective 
juror today cannot even sit on a capital jury unless she promises that 
she would be able and willing to impose a sentence of death.  
The practical effect of ‘death-qualification’ is to expose the 
capitally accused to increased odds of receiving the death penalty, 
and to eliminate the voices of citizens who would opt to ‘check’ the 
government's decision to inflict this penalty.143  
Cohen and Smith argue, as does this Note, that death qualification of 
juries undermines the legitimacy of capital punishment. Citizens who serve 
as jurors shape the law through their application of law to facts. If citizens 
believe a law allowing for punishment by death is cruel and unjust, they 
should be allowed to express that through jury service. Even though courts 
applied the death penalty when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were 
written, the authors still anticipated some members of the community 
having a moral opposition to the death penalty and expressing that 
opposition through jury service. By excluding those who do not consent to 
the death penalty as an appropriate punishment, the State is not using force 
with the consent of the governed – it is using force with the consent of those 
who consent to the use of force. 
At the time of the founding, jury service was viewed, and should still 
be viewed, as way to express ongoing consent to the law of society.144 
Professor Vikram David Amar argues that jury service should be viewed as 
political participation equivalent to voting.145 “[Jury service] is an amalgam 
of a right, a duty, and a badge of community membership.”146 Professor 
 
 
143. Id. at 89. 
144. See Cohen & Smith, supra note 142.  
145. Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL 
L. REV. 203, 218 (1995)  
Constitutional history provides strong support for the Supreme Court's recognition, in Powers 
and Edmonson, of the link between jury service and other rights of political participation. Jury 
service was understood at the time of the founding by leaders on all sides of the ratification 
debate as one of the fundamental prerequisites to majoritarian self-government. Indeed, one of 
the sharpest attacks anti-federalists could make on the new Constitution was that it did not go 
far enough in the protection of the institution of juries. The federalists took this charge seriously 
and ultimately responded by, among other things, enacting the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Amendments…. As the anti-federalist historian Herbert Storing has eloquently stated, ‘[t]he 
question was not fundamentally whether the lack of adequate provision for jury trial would 
weaken a traditional bulwark of individual rights (although that was also involved) but whether 
it would fatally weaken the role of the people in the administration of government.’ (citations 
omitted). 
146. Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 121, 124 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
136     WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 12:1 
 
 
 
Amar notes that originally, “the jury's function in the federal constitutional 
scheme was not limited to the protection of individual litigants. Rather, the 
jury was an essential democratic institution because it was a means by which 
citizens could engage in self-government.”147 Professor Amar further argues 
that the founders expected juries to shape the law itself by their application 
of law to facts.148 Today, nearly 50% of Americans believe that laws 
permitting punishment by death are unjust as applied to any facts149. 
Excluding those citizens whose opposition to the death penalty “would 
prevent or impair the performance of their duties” as jurors during the 
sentencing phase violates their right to self-government.150 This undermines 
the legitimacy of the use of force by the State, and violates the civil rights 
of the criminal defendant and the excluded jurors.151  
Justice Kennedy observed in Powers v. Ohio152 that, "with the exception 
of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most 
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process."153 
Witherspoon-excludable jurors are still citizens who have given up their 
natural rights into the hand of the sovereign/collective. They have not done 
anything to forfeit their rights as citizens, and they deserve to voice their 
discomfort with the “ultimate punishment.”  
Some social contract theorists have argued that even forbidding ex-
felons from serving on juries delegitimizes punishment.154 In the current 
death qualification scheme, we are excluding people who have never 
violated the social contract. This is problematic because, were we to place 
these people in Rawls’ original position today, they might very well decide 
not to give their new society the power to take life as punishment.  
 
 
(2003)  
This is the essence of democratic self-government. Having a group of citizens decide who is 
guilty of a crime or liable for damages-as opposed to having elites decide — -is perhaps the 
most feasible way to have cases decided by the community. For all of their learning and 
training, judges — -even elected ones — -do not represent the community as well as a jury. To 
be representative, a jury must stand for the whole community, not just subsets of it. 
147. Amar, supra note 145, at 218. 
148. Id. at 219. 
149. Jones, supra note 23. 
150. See Cohen, supra note 144, at 90.  
151. See Adam M. Clark, An Investigation of Death Qualification as a Violation of the Rights 
of Jurors, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2005-2006) (arguing that death qualification excludes jurors from 
a fundamental right simply for holding a belief widely shared domestically and internationally).  
152. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
153. Id. at 407. 
154. Levine, supra note 2.  
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A common justification for death qualifying juries, whether spoken or 
unspoken, is to avoid jury nullification.155 Jury nullification occurs when 
jurors who disagree with a law or its punishment find a defendant not guilty, 
even if the evidence is otherwise.156 However, jury nullification is 
completely justified under social contract theory.157 “Jury nullification 
allows the jury to find a defendant guilty, but to refuse to impose the 
statutorily enumerated punishment when it contradicts the community’s 
belief.”158 Matthew K. Suess argues that punishment is only justified under 
Locke’s social contract theory when its source is “the open condemnation 
of the community. This is evidenced by Locke’s belief that every individual 
had a right, and even a duty, to participate in punishment. Not only did the 
community judge an individual’s guilt or innocence, but the community also 
determined the extent of punishment.”159 If this is true, then jury 
nullification should be permitted, even encouraged. Jury nullification is part 
of a “longstanding American willingness to use citizens as a buffer between 
the defendant and the harsh and sometimes arbitrary enforcement of the 
law.”160 Jury nullification, and by extension ceasing the practice of death 
qualification of juries, enables a jury to truly act as the conscience of the 
community. 
B. The United States Cannot Rely on the Political Process to Reflect the 
Will of the People 
Opponents may argue that if allowed to serve, these death-opposed 
jurors would violate the social contract by refusing to impose a punishment 
authorized by law. Indeed, this is the argument advanced in Lockhart v. 
McCree. However, because jury service is one way in which the social 
contract is renegotiated and reinforced, this concern is misplaced. The 
problem with this view is it rests on the premise that the social contract, 
entered into at the founding of this country, is unchanging and immutable. 
This is simply inconsistent with the vision that Thomas Jefferson had for 
our democracy.161 The death penalty should not be the law if it does not 
have the support of even a majority of citizens. Yes, citizens could change 
the law through the political process. But citizens can and should also 
 
 
155. Clark, supra note 151, at 8. 
156. Rozelle, supra note 141. 
157. See Matthew K. Suess, Punishment in the State of Nature: John Locke and Criminal 
Punishment in the United States of America, 7 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 367, 395-96 (2015). 
158. Id.  
159. Id.  
160. Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 76, at 1186. 
161. See Merriam, supra note 86. 
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change the law by refusing to impose the punishment at the sentencing 
phase of trials. 
We cannot remain inactive and assume the political process will remedy 
this defect. This Note argues that it follows from Rawls’ views on civil 
disobedience that allowing Witherspoon-excludables to serve on juries and 
vote their conscience, against the death penalty, would be justified. Twenty-
ine states have legislatively abolished or judicially overturned the death 
penalty, and an additional four have a gubernatorial moratorium on death 
sentences.162 While this does not show that normal means of changing the 
law have failed, as Rawls identified as a condition necessary for civil 
disobedience, it does show 1) that the general nationwide trend is towards 
abolishment of the death penalty, and 2) the case law regarding jury service 
has failed to respond to this reality. Thus, under Rawls’ theory, jurors should 
be allowed to advocate for a change in law by serving on juries and voting 
their conscience, even when the law of the jurisdiction says that death is a 
legal option for punishment. The death penalty is never a mandatory 
punishment.163 There is a wide space in the jury deliberation room for 
arguments and compromises with regard to punishment. No juror is forced 
to choose between death and letting the defendant go free. All voices should 
be heard in the deliberations.  
 In addition, Professor Sharon Dolovich notes the problems with relying 
solely on political means to justify and/or change the legal status of the death 
penalty. Dolovich points out that it raises normative problems to say that 
state punishment can be completely legitimized by appealing to democratic 
majoritarianism. Nothing inherent in the majoritarian standard ensures that 
legislators consider the interests of all people when legislating. In fact, by 
appealing to voters as being “tough on crime,” or “for law and order,” 
legislators are often incentivized to pass laws without considering the harm 
those laws can work on politically disenfranchised minorities.164  
As a practical matter, the very people who are excluded from jury 
service are also more often prevented from voting or impeded in their efforts 
to vote.165 It is possible that their voices could be silenced both in the jury 
 
 
162. Death Penalty Information Center, States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty 
[https://perma.cc/C22X-MCSV]. 
163. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
(1976). 
164. Dolovich, supra note 4, at 313. 
165. Gretchen Frazee, Laura Santhanam, “What the Supreme Court’s Gerrymandering Decision 
Means for 2020,” PBS News Hour (June 28, 2019) https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/what-the-
supreme-courts-gerrymandering-decision-means-for-2020 [ https://perma.cc/7VU6-UUEE]. See also 
Ann M. Eisenberg, Removal of Women and African Americans in Jury Selection in South Carolina 
Capital Cases, 1997-2012, 9. N.E. U. L.J. 299, 308 (2017) (“All else being equal, white jurors are more 
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box and at the ballot box. Furthermore, the very fact that they are 
Witherspoon-excludables could decrease their political efficacy. Clark 
notes that death qualification essentially sends a message that all those who 
are categorically opposed to the death penalty are “unable to follow the law 
or the jurors' oath. This in turn puts a certain amount of stigma on the 
abolitionist juror…. It is difficult to win a political battle as a group that is 
branded as unable to follow the law.”166 Accordingly, the defenses of death 
qualification that say that social contract theory compels jurors to follow the 
law, or that excluded jurors should simply vote to repeal the death penalty, 
do not solve the problem.  
C. The Social Contract Is Not Static 
A common justification for capital punishment is that the death penalty 
cannot be in any way contrary to the Constitution because it was lawful 
when the Constitution was written. Proponents of the death penalty 
correctly point out that punishment by death is contemplated in the 
Constitution.167 When social contract theory is considered, they might argue 
that the original contractors weighed the benefits of the punishment with the 
risk that they themselves would be subjected to it and consented to the use 
 
 
apt to vote for death than are black jurors.”). Support for the death penalty could be lowest among women 
and minorities because they know that the laws will not always be applied equally, so they are not 
comfortable giving up this right/allowing the State this liberty. See Dolovich, supra note 4, at 366-68  
[U]nder the conditions of a partially compliant society, there is no basis for the parties to be 
confident that those who will face state punishment as convicted offenders will necessarily be 
guilty of the crimes charged. To the contrary, in a social context in which the institutions and 
operations of the criminal justice system are flawed and untrustworthy and known to be so, the 
parties will know that some (indeterminate) number of convicted offenders incarcerated by the 
state will in fact be innocent… if the parties are to ensure the greatest protection of their security 
and integrity, they must instead assume that they could wind up, through no fault of their own, 
facing state punishment as convicted offenders…And because, as we have seen, the parties lack 
the information that would allow any estimating of probabilities as to their own chances of 
being innocents wrongfully targeted for state punishment, the parties must consider what it 
would mean for anyone to be so treated… 
This is precisely why they should be allowed to express this non-consent through jury service. See 
Cover, supra note 110, at 119  
Although some argue that the current Supreme Court law on death qualification has been 
erroneously interpreted to exclude too many death-averse prospective jurors, the practical result 
of the Supreme Court's death-qualification jurisprudence has been to enable some prosecutors 
to strike for cause virtually any juror with serious reservations about his or her ability to impose 
the death penalty. 
166. Clark, supra note 151, at 39. 
167. “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger…” U.S. CONST. amend V, cl. 1.  
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of deadly force by the State. However, evolving standards of decency have 
made it now so that a majority of citizens, if they were in a state of nature 
negotiating a social contract into which they would enter tomorrow, would 
never surrender into the hands of the sovereign/collective the power to take 
a life in punishment for a crime. This change is possibly due to a growing 
awareness by United States citizens that the death penalty’s application in 
the United States is not an effective deterrent, presents a significant risk of 
executing innocents, and is disproportionately enforced on racial 
minorities.168 
Thomas Jefferson did not believe that the social contract was cemented 
after first being entered into; rather, he believed it would be “periodically 
renewed.”169 Just because the death penalty was contemplated in the 
Constitution does not mean that it is forever within a society’s standard of 
decency. “Since conditions change and men change, there must be 
opportunity for corresponding change in political institutions, and also for 
a renewal of the principle of government by consent of the governed.”170 
D. Life-Qualifying Juries Does Not “Cancel Out” the Problems Caused by 
Death Qualification 
Although courts also allow permit defendants to “life-qualify” juries, it 
does not remedy the harm caused by death qualification.  Morgan v. Illinois 
held that “a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror 
who will automatically vote for the death penalty” if the defendant is found 
guilty.171 This is sometimes called “life-qualification.” Professor Aliza 
Plener Cover refutes the argument that death qualification should be 
tolerated just because potential jurors who would refuse to consider a life 
sentence for convicted murderers are also disqualified. First, Cover points 
 
 
168. “Less Support for Death Penalty, Especially Among Democrats.” Pew Research Center 
(Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.people-press.org/2015/04/16/less-support-for-death-penalty-especially-
among-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/E7BG-C43L]. 
169. Merriam, supra note 86, at 26  
 
Government is established, however, by the ‘consent of the governed,’ or at least a just 
government is so supported. What, then, is the nature of this consent, and how is it to be made 
effective amid constantly changing conditions? Jefferson was not satisfied with a contract made 
once and for all, like that of Hobbes, or with a merely hypothetical contract, or even with a 
presumption of tacit consent from the fact of residence. He looked upon the contract as a 
necessary foundation for legitimate government, and he considered that the agreement should 
have historical as well as logical validity. The principle of the social contract must be sacredly 
preserved in the life of the people, and Jefferson proposed two ways of insuring this end: first, 
by revolution; second, by periodical renewal of the agreement. 
170. Merriam, supra note 86. 
171. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). 
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out that because a death verdict must be unanimous in most jurisdictions, a 
single seated juror who fundamentally opposes the death penalty can play a 
decisive role in the verdict.172 The same cannot be said for automatic-death, 
Morgan-excludable jurors. Death qualification has a more direct impact on 
the verdict reached. Second, judges are more likely to dismiss potential 
jurors for cause based on their opposition to the death penalty.173 Therefore, 
life-qualification of juries under Morgan does not even come close to 
canceling out the damage done by death qualification.  
Research done by the Capital Jury Project supports Cover’s position. 
Over 70% of actual jurors from actual capital murder trials interviewed 
responded that “death ‘was the only acceptable punishment’ for murders 
committed by a defendant with a prior murder conviction.”174 “Almost 60% 
agreed that death was the only acceptable punishment for ‘planned or 
premeditated murder.’”175 It is obvious that many potential jurors do not 
understand mitigating factors or the law they will be required to apply at 
sentencing, yet they are seated on capital juries despite being excludable 
under Morgan.  
CONCLUSION 
Death qualifying juries in capital murder trials delegitimizes capital 
punishment because it violates the social contract. Social contract theory 
influenced the drafters of our Constitution and has been explicitly invoked 
in judicial opinions as both a basis for decisions and as a rhetorical device 
to lend legitimacy to decisions. Many social contract theorists argue that 
punishment is only a legitimate use of force by the State when it is based on 
principles that all citizens would agree to as reasonable, rational, and just, 
knowing that they themselves control the conduct that might subject them 
to such punishment. If the United States is going to rely on social contract 
theory to give its laws legitimacy, then its laws ought to be created, 
enforced, and applied on a basis that is consistent with social contract 
theory. 
Serving on a jury is one of the ways in which the social contract is 
constantly renegotiated and reaffirmed. Excluding those citizens whose 
 
 
172. Cover, supra note 110, at 122. 
173. Id. (“[W]hile some-but few-genuinely "death-disqualified" (or automatic-life) jurors 
ultimately serve on capital juries, there is strong empirical evidence that a large number of ‘life-
disqualified’ (or automatic-death) jurors make it into the jury box.”). 
174. Rozelle, supra note 134, at 788 (citing William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still 
Singularly Agonizing: Law's Failure to Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 
51, 62 (2003)). 
175. Id.  
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“opposition to the death penalty would prevent or impair the performance 
of their duties as jurors”176 during the sentencing phase of a capital murder 
trial imposes punishment to which not all citizens have consented. Instead 
of the consent of the governed, the State is using force with the consent of 
those who consent. We have seen that a large number of citizens are 
excluded, and the number is constantly growing. This is bad for society, not 
just the individual defendant or the excluded jurors. It is unjust.  
The Supreme Court has rejected the legal argument against death 
qualification based on the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Witherspoon v. Illinois, Lockhart v. McCree, and 
Wainwright v. Witt have firmly established the practice of death qualifying 
juries. However, at a time when the country is split right down the middle 
on the death penalty, it cannot be said that death is a punishment to which 
citizens consent, “based on a perception that they will be better off under 
such a system than they would be in its absence.”177 If half of the country 
opposes the death penalty for convicted murderers, that sentiment should be 
reflected in the social contract. 
The voices kept out of the jury room are also the voices commonly kept 
out of the ballot box and out of office, so we cannot simply rely on 
legislatures to repeal the death penalty. As President Barack Obama once 
said, “Our Constitution is a remarkable, beautiful gift. But it’s really just a 
piece of parchment. It has no power on its own. We, the people, give it 
power. We, the people, give it meaning.”178 It’s time for the United States 
to give the people back their power, and let them give meaning to the words 
written in the Constitution. Let them sit on juries, let them apply laws to 
facts, and let them nullify laws if they see fit. The United States needs to 
stop death qualifying capital juries, or else we will be imposing the ultimate 
punishment without the consent of the governed in a way that conflicts with 
the foundations of our judicial system.
 
 
176. Wainwright, supra note 14, at 424 (citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). 
177. Finkelstein, supra note 77, at 1329. 
178. Obama, supra note 1. 
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